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1. Introduction 
“Person” is a very ambiguous word (as most of our 
words when isolated).  The outstanding vagueness of the 
terms used in philosophical discourse, like “action” or 
“mind”, is an essential characteristic of language that 
provides the set upon which philosophy relies.  Indeed, 
inquiries into certainty, objectivity and many other 
important metaphysical problems would never arise if this 
indeterminacy were not present in language.  The history 
of philosophy as such can be considered as a quest for 
meaningful statements on which we can ground our 
judgment.  This search for certainty has an ethical 
dimension, since it discloses what we have in common and 
what we cannot share.  An important feature of this ethical 
dimension is that the investigation of “certainty” is, at the 
same time, a struggle against arbitrariness.  However, we 
must be careful while engaging into this exploration, by 
refusing to analyze or equate certainty with goodness or 
correctness.  The danger of this attractive analysis is 
evident in our religious and political history.   
I believe that Wittgenstein can help us in 
elucidating some of these difficult issues.  The problem of 
the identity of persons, or what constitutes a human being, 
pervades through philosophical texts.  The general 
strategy of this paper is to link the issue of certainty, as 
explained by Wittgenstein, with the concept of person. 
 
2. Wittgenstein’s Distinction between 
Bedrock and Ground 
The following remarks are the basis of my 
discussion about bedrock and ground.   
“And the bank of that river consists partly of hard 
rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible 
one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another 
gets washed away, or deposited.” (Wittgenstein 1972, 15e-
99). 
“It might be imagined that some propositions, of 
the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and 
functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as 
were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered 
with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard 
ones became fluid.” (Wittgenstein 1972, 15e-96).  
“Doesn’t one need grounds for doubt?” 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 18e-122). 
“The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of 
our believing.” (Wittgenstein 1972, 24e-166). 
“Foundation” or the German “grundlagen”, “sense 
data”, “the given”, “impressions”, are names for something 
wrongly called “ground”.  Why does Wittgenstein think this 
is wrong?  For him, bedrock (or the limit to our inquiries), is 
different from ground because a ground can be known; it is 
something that speaks for something else: we can doubt 
about it, we can be right or wrong, we can look at it as a 
hypothesis, etc…  “Bedrock” is something we just reach 
(unconsciously) where we find silence and attitudes.  The 
hypothesis of the mathematical continuum and our 
awareness about the fact that we cannot talk with animals 
are examples of this lack of knowledge and justification. 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty might be considered 
as a strategy to show how our certainty is never related to 
knowledge.  It makes us face a crude fact, a very different 
one from Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance (familiarity 
with things as an epistemic relation).  We can even say 
that it is more an attitude than a fact.   
“The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt 
comes after belief.” (Wittgenstein 1972, 23e-60). 
“I might suppose that Napoleon never existed and 
is a fable, but not that the earth did not exist 150 years 
ago.” (Wittgenstein 1972, 26e-186).  
 
3. Persons and Rights 
I think bedrock or our worldview is a path for action 
(which means that it is ethical in all instances).  If we are 
Aristotelian in this respect, action as such is impossible 
without such a pathway, which is provided by thought.  Our 
freedom depends on the possibility of conceiving different 
paths for action, thus reshaping our beliefs and attitudes.  
It seems that justification and judgment (or critique) is what 
makes us initiate the process of changing our attitudes and 
commitments.  To have a unique worldview is to be 
enslaved and plunged into absolute determination.  The 
tension is then to know how and why the hardened 
sections of bedrock change, as well as which are shared 
by humankind and which are cultural.   
We need particular worldviews to interpret the 
world as well as to act through choices we make in 
particular scenarios.  My identity as person is determined 
by my story (or standpoint, determined by my worldviews, 
which provide options for my actions).  To use Robert 
Nozick’s expression, the “closest continuer” of me is my 
story (Nozick R 1981, passim).  So what does it mean that 
I share a unique story (or bedrock) with humankind and at 
the same time that I am free to act by reflecting on different 
possibilities and consequences of my actions?  Empirical 
statements seem to be independent of my story.  That my 
body will not suddenly evaporate and that I will not wake 
up tomorrow in the body of a different person is part of my 
certainty for action and thought.  It is important to draw our 
attention to the fact that the very scenario itself, the very 
possibility of entertaining into these thought experiments is 
based on further assumptions, like the linearity of time and 
the gap between mind and body.  Is this a worldview I 
share with humankind?  Any answer (positive or negative) 
to this question seems to be problematic.  This 
indeterminacy is important to make clear why justification 
comes to an end. 
Although Wittgenstein suggests that this tension 
can never be answered, nor can we find any ground to 
know or doubt about bedrock, I think there is a way in 
which we can show how bedrock operates with respect to 
the concept of person through the notion of human rights. 
Human rights are the minimum conditions under 
which human dignity is supposed to be reached or at least 
guaranteed.  Human dignity refers in this case to 
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circumstances and not to actual humans.  Although human 
rights claim for universality, their specificity (for example in 
a given judicial decision) reveals some anxieties between 
worldviews.  We can focus in the well known tension 
between the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.  There are some human rights (like 
the right not to be tortured) which might be considered as 
absolute, in the sense that if they clash with another 
human right the decision must be made as privileging 
them.  For example, we cannot entertain the idea (or the 
thought experiment) of torturing people for the sake of 
preserving freedom of expression or the right to be 
informed.    
These are concerns within the same worldview, 
namely, the liberal and individualistic worldview of the 
ICCPR.  However, there are clashes between worldviews 
within human rights, such as the clash between the right to 
preserve cultural identity with respect to the right to 
property, (as in the case of communal tribes) or bodily 
integrity and the cultural tradition of circumcision or other 
forms of mutilation or deformation of the body as elements 
of identity or attachment to a particular society.  We can 
say that, at the end, our notion of conceivability (the realm 
of the imaginable where we can find paths for our action) 
depends to a great extent on our ethical convictions and 
beliefs.  This is why we say it is unimaginable to torture 
babies just because we find it amusing.  But how is this 
related to our incapacity to talk with the Wittgensteinian 
wood sellers or about the fact that the chair will not 
evaporate and that objects continue being the same 
through time.  As Wittgenstein pointed out, it seems that 
the most plausible approach to the problem is that belief 
has a stronger role in our life than what we normally 
suppose. 
Going back to our discussion about human rights, 
we can consider the clash of worldviews as one which is 
essentially ethical.  The dispute between individualism and 
communitarianism, Kantian based normative moralities, 
utilitarianism and moral skepticism are all forms of 
alternatives to avoid, as much as possible, conflictive 
pathways for action.  Nevertheless, these few alternatives 
are not as rich as they claim, because we shall finally 
realize that our notion of freedom is exactly the opposite to 
the construction of a single worldview. 
 
4. Persons and Aspects of Persons 
If we force an analogy between aspect dawning 
(as used by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations) 
and worldviews, we can find in the discussion of human 
rights some aspects of what is a human being.  It is 
important at this moment to recall that when we start 
doubting about bedrock (or trying to justify it) we are in the 
domain of nonsense (a domain that exists only in jokes).  
But why does this seem not to be a joke like “I know I am 
in pain” or “I know I am here”?  The appalling image of 
torture is not nonsense nor is it something we can justify.  
Although it seems within the things we can know, it 
nevertheless stands fast for us. 
The violation of the right not to be tortured or to 
bodily integrity seems beyond any explanation.  We cannot 
justify circumcision (whether feminine or masculine) 
whereas we can belief that it makes us part of something 
bigger than us.  However, we can justify that it is 
impossible to privilege any right above the right not to be 
tortured.  So it is essential to our notion of person to 
privilege some rights over others (in some manner of 
justification) but also to have a bedrock account of what is 
to be human as it stands fast for us.   
Human dignity seems to start with the notion of 
inviolability of the body and the preservation of our integrity 
as individuals.  Other rights, like property or freedom of 
expression are somehow part of our dignity, but because 
of some inexplicable situation we are prone to say that 
they are contingent, we can justify their repression for the 
sake of the basic rights of dignity.  The problem is that, this 
very notion of dignity relies on a series of unjustifiable 
beliefs, for example, that my body continues through time 
and that it is a unity.  We cannot argue against this and 
this is why it is so fundamental for us nowadays (although 
it has not always been the case).  This elementary 
character of these basic rights seems to be linked with our 
metaphysical convictions.  It seems nonsensical to discuss 
whether this is related or not to the unity of mind and body 
or rather to the gap between these entities.  It is just part of 
our bedrock.  We know that because our discussions on 
these topics create thought experiments that are either 
jokes or nightmares.  There is nothing more to say about 
our notion of person. 
If we try to consider different aspects of persons to 
characterize them, like their juridical nature (being a 
subject of rights and obligations and not a mere object of 
them) we will fail in grasping what is at stake, since to 
know what is exactly to be a person is something we 
cannot really know.  For instance, we share our juridical 
nature with corporations and governments (since we 
attribute to them some sort of mind and body).  We can 
push this further and say that we attribute to animals and 
to God such a mind set; some sort of body or mind with 
intentions, or at least with feelings.   
To conclude, we might say that the current speech 
on human rights, their justifiability and the issues of 
philosophy of mind related to the problem of mind and 
body are misleading attempts to determine something that 
is undeterminable, historical and absolutely contingent; 
something that simply stands fast for us: a set of possible 
worldviews that constitute a particular complex of 
pathways through which my action is determined; which 
constitute my very essence as an individual human being 
with particular commitments and convictions. 
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